preferences for safety risks from state level public choices about speed limits. The idea is to measure the value of the time saved per incremental fatality that results from the voluntary adoption of an increased speed limit. Since adopters must have valued the time saved by greater speeds more than the fatalities created, this ratio provides a convincing and credible upper bound on the value of a statistical life (VSL). 1 Although there have been a number of creative attempts designed to estimate the value of a statistical life, there have been few opportunities to obtain estimates based on the public's willingness to accept an exogenous and known safety risk and to do this for multiple independent decision makers. 2 The empirical analysis we report here exploits the opportunity that the federal government gave the states in 1987 to choose a speed limit for rural interstate highways that was higher than the uniform national maximum speed limit then in existence.
This institutional change allows us to address two key conceptual problems that have plagued previous attempts to estimate the VSL. First, most methods for assessing the VSL from labor market data are not based on choices made in the face of exogenous safety risks. This results in estimates of the VSL that often are not based on credible identification assumptions or suffer from serious potential omitted variables bias. 3 For example, we demonstrate that conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation
indicates that speeds and highway fatality rates are uncorrelated, presumably due to drivers' optimizing decisions. To avoid this problem of omitted variables, we use states' decisions about adopting a higher speed limit in response to the 1987 law as an instrumental variable (IV). In sharp contrast to the OLS results, this IV estimation strategy indicates that speeds and fatalities are highly correlated and that adopters received approximately $1.5 million (1997$) per marginal fatality.
Second, our estimates of the tradeoff between the value of time saved and fatalities can be made from comparisons of rural interstates and other highways within states that adopted increased speeds, as well as from comparisons with roads in non-adopting states. This statistical design permits us to obtain separate estimates of this tradeoff for each of the states with complete data that changed speed limits.
Consequently, we can also examine how "publication bias" might lead to "consensus" estimates of the VSL being determined by a selected sample of the estimated tradeoffs. Since only "successful" analyses are likely to be published, we implement several of the most likely "publication rules" and show that the consensus estimate is likely to be significantly upward biased by publication bias. 
II. What is Being Measured?
Assuming that decisions to increase speed limits reflect informed voter preferences, there still remains the question of what part of the distribution of preferences is measured by our empirical analysis.
To study this problem, it is essential to distinguish between (a) the technical constraint that connects speeds to fatalities and (b) the preferences of voters as between speed and fatality risks. We may observe the technical constraint, but we can only infer voter/driver preferences from their choices.
To understand the issues, suppose the median driver/voter in state i is offered the opportunity to increase the speed limit from S i to S i ' through the political process. Associated with this offer is a decrease in the cost of travel time of w∆h i , which is measured as the product of the value of time (w, the 3 wage) and the amount of time saved (measured in hours, h). Also associated with this offer is an increase in the fatality rate (f) of ∆f i , so that we may display the heterogeneity in this offer by writing
The left hand side of equation (1) is a discrete measure of the value of time saved (V) as a result of the speed limit change. We use the 1987 law to estimate the V i 's, as well as their mean.
The value of a statistical life, V i *, reflects the preferences toward safety (the rate of substitution between money and risk) of the determining driver/voter in state i. 5 A higher speed limit will be adopted if V i > V i *, for in this case the time costs saved by the increased speeds that result from the higher speed limit will be greater per fatality than the value of the determining statistical life, V i *. The probability that the higher speed limit is adopted is thus:
It is apparent from (2) that the average value of V i amongst adopters, E(V i |Adoption) = E(V i |V i >V i *), must be at least as great as E(V i *|Adoption), the average value of a statistical life among adopters. Thus, the measured average value of time costs saved per marginal fatality from the adoption of an increased speed limit is generally greater than the mean value of a statistical life among adopters and provides an upper bound on that quantity. In addition in the special case where the value of a statistical life is constant across states (i.e., V i * = V*), the estimated average value of the time saved per marginal fatality from an increased speed limit is upward biased compared to what it would be for both adopters and non-adopters because the left hand side of equation (1) is only observed for adopters. 
III. Data and Econometric Methods
Data Sources. To conduct the analysis, we collected a data file on vehicle miles traveled (VMT), traffic fatalities, and vehicle speeds that covers the years 1982-1993 for urban and rural interstate highways and for rural arterial roads. States were allowed to increase the speed limit to 65 mph on rural interstates. They were prohibited from increasing the limit on the other two. Since these other roads generally had speed limits of 55 mph in 1987 and design features that closely resemble those of rural interstates, these two road types provide an important source of intra-state variation. traveling against the probability of a fatality is: There are a number of potential sources of bias that we can control with state, year, and roadtype dummy variables and many of their interactions. Even with the inclusion of the multitude of fixed effects indicated in υ srt, however, θ is not robust to time varying state-roadtype determinants of fatalities. As an example, it is possible that individuals drive more slowly when there is poor weather or heavy road repair precisely due to safety concerns. Our solution to this identification problem is to find a variable that affects speeds and that only affects fatalities through its effect on speeds. As Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) demonstrate, a plausible instrument is whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force. The OLS regressions indicate that speeds and fatalities are virtually uncorrelated. Although this may seems puzzling at first, it is not very surprising. After all, people will choose to travel more slowly in order to reduce the likelihood of a fatality when a road is unsafe (e.g., due to poor weather).
IV. Results
The IV estimates paint a very different picture. In particular, the two estimates of θ IV indicate that a 10% increase in fatalities is associated with a 1% to 1.1% reduction in travel times and these estimates would be judged statistically significant by conventional criteria. The similarity between the results in columns (1) and (2) indicates that in this setting state-year unobservables are not an important source of bias. The associated estimate of the IV monetary value of time saved per marginal fatality is approximately $1.5 million (1997$).
Overall, Table 1 has two primary findings. First, the OLS results illustrate the difficulty of making causal inferences when there is no exogenous variability in the data. In particular, the results in the top panel are consistent with the possibility that OLS will produce estimates of θ that are biased upwards due to individuals' compensatory behavior. Second, the use of the introduction of the 65-mph speed limit as an instrumental variable appears to mitigate this bias, if not entirely remove it.
We now undertake separate analyses for each of the 21 adopting states. Table 2 presents stateby-state estimates and standard errors of the IV elasticity between time saved and fatalities (cols. (1) and (2)) and the monetary value of time saved per marginal fatality (col. (3)). These are obtained from fitting versions of equation (3) that include the logarithm of VMT interacted with roadtype and state-roadtype, roadtype-year, and state-year fixed effects as controls. The sample for each of these regressions includes 6 observations on rural interstates, urban interstates, and rural arterials from the 7 states that retained the 55 mph limit and the state for which the estimate applies.
The entries reveal that 19 of the 21 IV elasticities have the expected negative sign. Notably, only 3 (Colorado, Iowa, and South Dakota) of the elasticities would be judged statistically significant at conventional levels. The estimated value of time saved per marginal fatality ranges from -$1.12 million (Arkansas) to $9.71 million (Wisconsin). As we report below, however, this enormous variability is entirely consistent with sampling error in the estimates. To explore what might happen if each state in our data were studied separately, with publication of each study determined by the standard peer-review process, we provide the analysis in Table 3 . Here, we consider each state-specific estimate of V a separate study that could have been undertaken by a researcher, submitted to a journal, and considered for publication by reviewers and the editor. 10 We further assume that the 21 adopting states with complete data form the universe of states that raised the speed limit. The different panels report the weighted mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the V i 's from alternative "publication rules," where the weight is the inverse of the IV elasticity's standard error.
Each of these rules leads to an estimate of V that is based on a different subsample of the universe of V i 's.
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The first panel reveals that the weighted average of all 21 state-specific estimates of V is $1.14 million. This estimate serves as the basis of comparison for the alternative publication rules. In the second panel, we impose the rule that to be published a study must have an IV elasticity with an associated p-value < .05. This is believed to be a common basis for determining a study's value. Three of the estimates meet this criteria and their weighted average is $2.31. Thus, this publication rule produces an estimate of V that is more than twice as large as the one based on the universe of estimates.
This is especially notable in a setting where the hypothesis that the treatment effect is homogeneous cannot be rejected. The third and fourth panels impose publication rules that require p-values < .05 for the reduced form relationships between the instrument and fatalities and speed, respectively. They also produce upward biased estimates of V, although the bias is smaller.
V. Conclusions
This study has demonstrated that omitted variables and publication bias can lead to severely biased estimates of the monetary value of time saved per marginal fatality. As a result, estimates of the value of a statistical life that do not account for these factors will also be severely biased. Although our empirical results are obtained in the context of a study of choices about road safety, we suspect that the same issues plague the estimation of the value of a statistical life in other contexts. (3). In column (1) the sample includes observations on rural interstates from the 28 states with complete data. In column (2) observations on urban interstates and rural arterials are added to the column (1) sample. In each specification, ln (vehicle miles of travel) interacted with road type is included as a control. The other controls are listed at the bottom of the table. In the top panel, equation (3) is fit by ordinary least squares while in the second panel an indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force is an instrumental variable for ln (Fatalities). See the text and Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) for further estimation details. * indicates significance at 5% level and ** indicates significance at 1% level. For each row the entries report the results from separate regressions where the sample includes observations on rural interstates, urban interstates, and rural arterials from the 7 states that retained the 55 mph limit and the state for which the estimate applies. The specifications regress ln (Hours of Travel) on ln (Fatalities), and the controls are ln (vehicle miles of travel) interacted with roadtype and state-roadtype, roadtype-year, and state-year fixed effects. An indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force is an instrumental variable for ln (Fatalities). Columns (1) and (2) report the parameter on ln (Fatalities) and its heteroskedastic-consistent standard error (in parentheses). Column (3) reports the estimated value of time saved per marginal fatality, which is calculated by multiplying the IV elasticity (column (1)) by the state-specific ratio of hours traveled to total fatalities and the state-specific mean hourly wage. See the text and Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) for further estimation details. * indicates significance at 5% level and ** indicates significance at 1% level States with Significant Speed Effect $1.48** ($0.38) N 13 Notes: Each panels report the weighted mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the V i 's from alternative "publication rules," where the weight is the inverse of the IV elasticity's standard error from Table 2 . See the text for further details. * indicates significance at 5% level and ** indicates significance at 1% level 
